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Introduction
The Japanese government repeatedly insisted that 
Japanese nationals would not tolerate the separation of 
Okinawa Islands from Japan and that local Okinawans 
also confirmed their desire to be in the Japanese 
domain when they communicated with the United 
States before the San Francisco Peace Conference 
in 1951 (Eldridge 2003: 204-209, 222).1 Some local 
people in Okinawa launched a signature campaign in 
April 1951 to express their preference for a reversion 
to Japan. The pro-reversion group of Okinawans in 
Tokyo actively sent petitions to the policy makers 
of Japan and the United States. A previous study 
indicates that U.S. government officials paid careful 
attention to the nation-wide sentiment and to the pro-
reversion preference in Okinawa, in the process of 
preparing the Treaty draft that underpinned the efforts 
of the Japanese government (Eldridge 2003: 214-
217). 
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The story of the territorial issue of Okinawa in 1951, 
the year of the San Francisco Peace Conference, seems 
to fit comfortably into the nationalistic narrative of 
Japan. The general explanation for the pro-reversion 
preference of Okinawa of that time resonates with it: 
they sought to return to “homeland” Japan (Arakawa 
2013:47-48), or it is understood in the continuity of 
the effort of becoming “Japanese” in the prewar era 
(Oguma 1998: 497-498). In this narrative, the pro-
reversion Okinawans in Okinawa and in Tokyo tend 
to be described as one political entity that forged 
the reversion campaign in each place to support the 
“national goal” of Japan.
Close analysis of the pro-reversion discourses of 
Okinawans in Okinawa and Tokyo, however, sheds 
light on different aspects of the story. This study 
aims to submit alternative explanations of the pro-
reversion preference in 1951 within the contemporary 
socio-political context. As discussed in the following 
sections, the pro-reversion argument in Okinawa 
emphasized the image of prewar Okinawa as the ideal, 
while avoiding mention of how the U.S. base would 
affect the lives of people on the island. Okinawans 
in Tokyo prioritized the confirmation of Japanese 
sovereignty over Okinawa, which secures their 
Japanese nationality in exchange for allowing the U.S. 
military station in Okinawa. The two pro-reversion 
arguments should be interpreted in the context of the 
contemporary socio-political conditions, that is, the 
exclusive power the United States held over Okinawa 
and the suppression of Korean people under GHQ 
(General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for 
the Allied Powers) occupied Japan. Through analysis 
and interpretation, this study will demonstrate that 
the emergence of the pro-reversion preference in 
1951 could be better understood as a result of the 
contemporary historical contingency and not entirely 
the outcome of Japanese nationalistic sentiment of 
Okinawans or the continuity from the prewar era. 
Recent years have witnessed a series of publications 
on the society and politics of early postwar Okinawa 
(Mori and Toriyama 2013; Toriyama 2013; Koike 
2015; Wakabayashi 2015). The status issue, however, 
has not yet received much academic analysis. A few 
exceptions are Oguma (1998), Toriyama (2001), and 
Sakurazawa (2007). Toriyama clarifies the drastic 
change of the social structure due to the intensive 
military base construction that possibly fostered 
a pro-reversion sentiment in Okinawa. The scope 
of his analysis is, however, restricted mainly to the 
Okinawa Islands. Oguma and Sakurazawa explain 
why the pro-reversion opinion emerged and attracted 
people’s support in 1951 from a historical viewpoint, 
but both tend to treat Okinawan people as a collective 
agent, paying less attention to the location of the 
advocates, that is, from where the arguments were 
made. Regarding the difference inside the Okinawan 
community, Tobe (2000) points out the complicated 
cultural power relations between Okinawa and Tokyo. 
Political issues such as the administrative status of 
Okinawa are, however, not the main theme of his 
historical analysis. This study expects to contribute 
to the literature by offering a cross-border, socio-
political analysis on the Okinawans’ orientation to 
reversion in the early postwar period. 
Our discussion first serves to introduce the outline 
of the Okinawa status debate in 1951, and the common 
characteristics of the pro-reversion arguments 
respectively in Okinawa and Tokyo. It then clarifies the 
difference between Okinawa and Tokyo in the way the 
pro-reversion opinions were expressed, based on the 
arguments that appeared in the media. In the following 
section, the cause of the difference is explained in 
the context of the socio-political conditions in both 
places. This study focuses especially on the political 
context of the GHQ occupation in order to interpret 
the “Japanese sovereignty first” argument made by 
Okinawans in Tokyo.
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1. The Okinawa status debate and pro-
reversion argument
The pro-reversion argument, or the status of Okinawa 
in general, became a political agenda in Okinawa 
in 1951 when the schedule of the Sun Francisco 
Peace Conference was fixed by the Allied Powers. 
Uruma Shimpō and Okinawa Times, the two main 
local newspapers, offered a forum for the Okinawa 
status debate from February to August 1951.2 The 
framework of the debate was the dichotomy of the 
pro-reversion position vs. the anti-reversion. Although 
the anti-reversion camp could be divided into the 
pro-trusteeship and pro-independence factions, the 
discussion on the whole showed a dichotomous 
structure. This pro and con framework was shaped 
by the anticipation that Okinawa would be put under 
the “trusteeship” of the United States or the United 
Nations after the Peace Treaty.3 From February 6 to 
August 15, Uruma Shimpō featured five pro-reversion 
opinions (by four persons) and seven anti-reversion 
opinions (by five persons) while Okinawa Times 
printed six pro-reversion opinions (by five persons) 
and four anti-reversion opinions (by three persons) 
from March 23 to July 25, 1951.
In the pro-reversion camp, Kamiyama Seiryō, 
Takamine Meitatsu, and Kaneji Saichi are the most 
active contributors, who publicized their opinions in 
a long series of columns.4 Kaneji was chief secretary 
of the local political party Okinawa Social Mass Party 
(Shakai Taishū tō), while Kamiyama and Takamine, 
ex-bureaucrats with the Ministry of Finance and 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry, respectively, 
were residents of Tokyo from prewar times. Having 
participants from Tokyo was one of the characteristics 
of the pro-reversion group. The main contributors on 
the anti-reversion side, Ikemiyagi Shui, Nakasone 
Genwa, and Shiroma Morio, were all local residents, 
respectively president of Uruma Shimpō newspaper 
company, general manager of another local political 
party the Republican Party (Kyōwa tō), and a lawyer.
The pro-reversionists in Tokyo and Okinawa shared 
many points in their narrative. Returning to Japan is 
“just natural” and “like a child going back to its parents’ 
place” according to the phrases frequently used in the 
arguments.5 Besides this naturalization, they stressed 
the positive aspects of pre-war Okinawa prefecture, 
despite the fact that the Okinawan had faced social 
discrimination under the rule of the Japanese Empire.6 
They highlight the political autonomy and suffrage 
2 A few exceptions are Nakasone Genwa and Nakayoshi Ryōkō. Nakasone publicized his pro-independence opinion as early as 1945 in 
the name of “house rent” that insisted that the Okinawan people are the owner of the islands from which the U.S. military rent the land 
(Nakasone 1955:183). Nakayoshi Ryōkō started publicizing his pro-reversion opinion in Okinawa in August 1945, then launched the 
political campaign in Tokyo in 1946 by organizing the “Association for the reversion of the Okinawan islands to Japan” (沖縄諸島日本復
帰期成会) (Nōtomi 2004: 49-53). 
3 Uruma Shimpō has 22 reports about Okinawa’s future status from 1946 to 1950 in which 12 items imply trusteeship as the possible 
option. Uruma Shimpō continued to feature similar articles in 1951. For example, “Peace treaty suggested from comments/Ryūkyū and 
Bonin islands will be under trusteeship of the United States” (談話からうかがう講和／琉球, 小笠原は米国の信託) on February 12. 
4 Kamiyama Seiryō, “Advocating for reversion to Japan” (日本復帰提唱), vol.1 to 3 in Uruma Shimpō, Feb. 10, 11, 13; Takamine Meitatsu, 
“Okinawa, where are you going” (沖縄よ何処へ行く), vol. 1 to 4 in Uruma Shimpō from Jul. 10 to 13, and in Okinawa Times, Jul. 10, 12,13, 
15; Kaneji Saichi, “Advocating to belong to Japan” (日本帰属提唱), vol.1 and 2 in Okinawa Times, Apr. 1 and 3, and “Again, advocating 
reversion to Japan” (再び日本復帰提唱), vol. 1 to 6 in Uruma Shimpō, May 22 to 25, 28, 29.
5 Kaneji emphasized the geographical closeness and racial and linguistic similarity between Okinawa and Japan (ibid., Okinawa Times, 
April 1 and 3). Kaneji and Kamiyama use the expression that Japan and Okinawa are “parent and child”: Kaneji, “Advocating to belong to 
Japan” (日本帰属提唱), Okinawa Times, Apr. 3, and Kamiyama, “Advocating for reversion to Japan” (日本復帰提唱), Uruma Shimpō, vol.1, 
Feb. 10, 1951. Similar rhetoric appeared in the petitions for Okinawa’s reversion to Japan sent by the Okinawan people in Tokyo. Eight out 
of ten of these petitions filed by Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan contain such expressions. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1950)
6 Okinawa, once known as Ryūkyū Kingdom before the Meiji Restoration, experienced discriminatory treatment and was exposed to the 
pressure of assimilation under the rule of the Japanese Empire. Reference to the memory of discrimination was found in the Okinawa status 
debate in 1951. For example “Opinions of status issue from the street” (帰属問題に街の声), in Uruma Shimpō Apr. 23, 1951. Pro-reversionist 
Takamine also referred to the “discriminatory treatment” in expressions such as “…young people in these day have no inferiority complex as the 
elderly did when they mentioned ‘the discriminatory treatment’ …” in “Okinawa, where are you going,” Uruma Shimpō, vol. 4, Jul. 13, 1951. 
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they gained as Japanese nationals, the economic 
development Okinawa achieved under Japan’s rule, 
and the cultural and educational modernization they 
experienced in prewar times.7 In evaluation of the 
postwar situation, they emphasized that Japan has 
changed drastically to a democratic country, which 
implied that Okinawans would not suffer from 
discrimination anymore in Japan. They argued that 
the Japanese economy was recovering steadily from 
the damage in the war so that Okinawa, still suffering 
from the severe destruction of the land battle, could 
continue its rehabilitation if aid from the United States 
were to stop due to its return to Japan.8 
The future image of Okinawa would be, they 
suggest, a continuation from that in prewar Okinawa 
prefecture: that is, enlargement of political freedom, 
regaining suffrage, and smooth recovery of the islands’ 
economy within the Japanese domain.9  In other words, 
returning to Japan was portrayed as going back to the 
“normal” path Okinawa had been tracing since it had 
became a part of the Japanese nation state. 
2. Differences among pro-reversionists 
over “leased land” status
There is a new factor brought in to the postwar 
Okinawa scenario, however: the U.S. military 
presence. This was the very point that the anti-
reversion group was concerned about.10 One of the 
reasons why they opposed reunification with Japan 
was the possibility of Okinawa becoming “leased 
land” (租借㆞). Ikemiyagi, an active contributor to 
the status debate, preferred U.N. trusteeship, claiming 
that if Okinawa returned to Japan now, that would 
mean return with the massive U.S. bases left intact. 
The United States would keep full control over their 
military installations even if Okinawa became a part 
of Japan again. Therefore, it was highly possible 
that Japan and the United States had an agreement 
to put Okinawa under a form of “leased land” status 
that would allow Japan to hold the sovereignty and 
the United States to keep political power over the 
land. It would bring a more difficult situation to local 
Okinawans.11 The expectation that the United States 
would not withdraw from Okinawa was held not 
only by Ikemiyagi, but was widely shared by local 
Okinawans. They had witnessed, since the late 1940s, 
the huge investment in base construction and related 
expenses that had changed the landscape of the island 
drastically (Toriyama 2013: 103-112).
Despite the U.S. presence in postwar Okinawa, the 
pro-reversion camp in Okinawa seldom mentioned 
how the U.S. base’s presence would affect the society 
7 Assimilation and “Japanization” was, in some aspects, regarded as a “tool” to achieve modernization (Oguma 1995: 281-282). Pressure 
to be Japanese also tended to have resulted in a discriminatory mindset among Okinawans (or sometimes called "Ryukyuans") against “less 
modernized” people such as the indigenous people in Taiwan, as was revealed in the case of “Jinruikan jiken” (Human exhibition incident 
in the 5th National industrial exposition in Osaka) in 1903.
8 See Kamiyama (ibid., Uruma Shimpō, February 10), Takamine (ibid., Uruma Shimpō, Jul. 11 to 13, and Okinawa Times, Jul. 12, 13, 15), 
and Kaneji (ibid., Okinawa Times, April 3, and Uruma Shimpō, May 25, 1951).
9 In terms of the continuity, Takamine stresses the importance to hold on the same path that Okinawans came through in prewar times. 
He assesses that the Okinawans succeeded in becoming “authentic Japanese” (rippa na nihonjin), so that continuity in education, which is 
necessary to preserve Japanese identity, is important to him. See Takamine, “Okinawa, where are you going,” Uruma Shimpō, vol. 4, Jul. 
13, 1951. Kaneji uses a similar expression: “At this moment, I cannot stand for seeing all the effort of nearly one century become in vain 
when Okinawa is cut off from Japan and Okinawan people reject being Japanese.” See Kaneji, “Again, Advocating Reversion to Japan,” 
Uruma Shimpō, vol. 2, May 23, 1951. The obsession to keep being Japanese itself, of course, implies the uneven position Okinawa was 
given in the Japanese Empire.
10 Shiroma Seizen (城間盛善), another anti-reversionist in the local debate, criticized the Okinawa image drawn by the pro-reversion group 
as implying the complete returning to the prewar status, with U.S. military withdrawal. Shiroma, “On accepting the Peace treaty” (講和の
受入態勢について), Uruma Shimpō, vol.2, Mar. 4, 1951.
11 Ikemiyagi Shūi, “Why I advocate the U.N. trusteeship” (何故国連信託を主張するのか), Uruma Shimpō, vol.3, Feb. 9, and “What does 
belonging to Japan mean?” (日本帰属は何を意味するのか), Uruma Shimpō, vol.3, Mar. 19.
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and lives of the islanders when Okinawa was put 
under Japanese sovereignty again. Kaneji did not 
respond to the risk of the “leased land” arrangement 
that Ikemiyagi had raised in the status debate. He only 
replied that the concern of being “leased land” only 
displays overanxiousness, by citing the statement of 
the Consultant to Secretary John Foster Dulles that 
the United States was not demanding extraterritorial 
rights over the military bases, but only the continued 
extension of facilities.12 
It was some members of the pro-reversionist group 
in Tokyo, instead, that referred to the future presence of 
the U.S. military bases and the possibility of becoming 
“leased land.” Pro-reversion opinions in Okinawa Shin 
Mimpō sometimes expressed a different opinion from 
those of the local Okinawans: they suggested that they 
would accept U.S. military bases in Okinawa, or agree 
that Okinawa would become leased land for a certain 
period, if Japanese sovereignty were allowed over 
the islands.13 For example, the editorial in the issue 
of January 5, 1951 argued “considering the tension in 
world politics today, we think there is no choice but to 
let the United States use Okinawa as a military base 
to ensure the future of Okinawa, Japan, and peace for 
the Far East. However, we have a completely different 
opinion on the idea to cut Okinawa off from Japan and 
put it outside Japan’s territory.”14 A similar argument 
appeared again in the editorial “Appeal again to 
Envoy Dulles” on February 5, 1951.
The ex-Diet member Ie revealed this type of pro-
reversion argument in the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs in the House of Councilors in February 6, 1951. 
Regarded as knowledgeable of the current situation 
of Okinawa and the Okinawans, Ie pointed out the 
difficult situation that Okinawans in Japan would 
face should Japan lose sovereignty over Okinawa. He 
said: “If Okinawa is put under a trusteeship system, 
we will fall into a sad situation in which our koseki 
(household registration) won’t belong to any country.” 
On the U.S. military bases stationed in Okinawa, he 
said “because we accepted unconditional surrender 
at the defeat, it can’t be helped that Okinawa’s land 
will be leased to the U.S. bases, or that we will allow 
them to stay in Japan’s sovereignty territory.” After 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House of 
Councillors, Ie commented that “it is Okinawans 
outside Okinawa that will be in a troublesome 
situation,” and confessed that he honestly felt that it 
would even be fine if Okinawa become “leased land” 
for military use in exchange for achieving Okinawa’s 
reversion to Japan.15 The rhetoric of “we are not 
opposed the U.S. bases being stationed in Okinawa” 
was repeatedly expressed in the petitions sent to U.S. 
authorities by the pro-reversion group in Tokyo.16 
Kamiyama and Takamine did not use such an 
apparent rhetoric in the arguments they published in 
the local newspapers.17 The prioritization of Japanese 
sovereignty, however, meant to put the U.S. base 
issue in Okinawa in secondary position. This shows 
a striking contrast with the pro-reversion argument in 
Okinawa. The pro-reversion advocates in Okinawa 
just kept silent on the U.S. presence. Few responded 
12 Kaneji, “Again, advocating reversion to Japan,” Uruma Shimpō, vol. 4, May 25, 1951. 
13 Okinawa Shin Mimpō is the ethnic newspaper published in Fukuoka prefecture from 1946 to 1953. The main readership was the 
Okinawan people who evacuated to Japan before the Okinawa land battle and remained there in the immediate postwar period. 
14 “Appeal to envoy Dulles as Okinawan people” (沖縄人としてダレス特使に訴う), Jan. 25, 1951.
15 “Even if becoming leased land militarily / Okinawans hope reversion to Japan / Ie and Nakayoshi plead in the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs” (軍租借地になっても／沖縄は復帰を希望／参院外務委で仲吉氏等発言), Okinawa Shin Mimpō, Feb. 15, 1951.
16 For example, the petition to the “Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway” dated Apr. 18, 
1951 (Nakayoshi Ryōkō Documents, 009), the petition to President Truman dated May 10, 1951, “Voluntary Okinawans in Tokyo / Petition 
to the U.S. president” (沖縄出身東京在有志／米大統領に請願) in Okinawa Shin Mimpō, Jul. 15, and the petition to “His Excellency the 
Ambassador John Foster Dulles” dated July 14, 1951 (Nakayoshi Ryōkō Document, 016).
17 One exception is Kamiyama, who suggested that the goal of the United States is just the securement of the military institutions in 
Okinawa, not the territoriality. “Suggestion for reversion to Japan” (日本復帰提唱), Uruma Shimpō, vol.2, Feb. 11, 1951.
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to the concern of the risk of being “leased land” as 
discussed above.
For the local Okinawan, however, daily life with 
massive U.S. bases did matter if Okinawa returned 
to Japan. When Takamine visited Okinawa in early 
1951, a local Okinawan asked him: “I think it’s no 
problem belonging to Japan. But the U.S. military 
would not withdraw from Okinawa for sure. Given 
this, what happens to the legal and economic status 
of people in Okinawa? Without a clear explanation, 
I cannot agree with Okinawa’s reversion to Japan.” 
Introducing this conversation in The Okinawa, an 
ethnic magazine issued in Tokyo, Takamine continues 
his reply: the reversion to Japan is “the primary issue 
of ethnic survival” (民族存立第一義的要件) and 
“concrete issues” (具体的問題), such as the U.S. base 
problem, could possibly be solved by the “good will” 
of Japan and the U.S. government.18 
It is highly possible that the reversion-to-Japan 
advocates in Okinawa would have known their 
counterparts’ way of arguing in mainland Japan. 
Pro-reversion groups in Tokyo and in Okinawa have 
confirmed that, via personal contact in 1950, they 
shared the same political preferences and common 
goal so as to push forward the campaign hand in 
hand (Yoshida 1976:41). Besides, Okinawan people 
in Okinawa, in Japan, and in overseas immigrant 
communities such as Hawaii were sharing the ethnic 
journals and publications since the postal service 
was restored.19 In spite of the active exchange of 
information among Okinawa communities, the pro-
reversionists in Okinawa seem not to have commented 
on this “sovereignty first, base issue second” type of 
argument. 
The intricate relationships and positionalities 
between Tokyo and Okinawa were the flip side of the 
argumentation over the status issue. Early in 1951, 
Nakayoshi and Kamiyama in Tokyo encouraged 
the local Okinawan people to clarify their political 
attitude toward the Okinawa status issue as the peace 
treaty was being scheduled.20 At the same time, 
however, they describe their position as that of “being 
an outsider,” and assumed the people in Okinawa to 
be the primary stakeholders. Takamine stated that 
“this status issue is primarily up to the local Okinawan 
people. If the majority are against going back to 
Japan, I will withdraw my pro-reversion argument.”21 
A similar tone was found in Nakayoshi’s narrative.22 
On the other hand, Taira Tatsuo, the Okinawa Guntō 
Governor and well-known advocate of reversion 
to Japan, struck a different tone in his new year’s 
remarks in 1951. He said that fellow Okinawans in 
Tokyo cry out to encourage the locals to declare their 
opinion on the status issue, but this is because the 
Tokyo Okinawans do not know the actual conditions 
in Okinawa.23 
3. Interpreting the opinions gap based 
on the socio-political context
Why did the pro-reversion advocates in Okinawa 
refrain from referring to the U.S. bases issue? How 
can we understand the “sovereignty first, base issue 
18 Takamine Metitatsu, “Reply to the objection to belonging to Japan” (日本帰属への異論に関する所見) in The Okinawa, April issue, 1951.
19 For example, Okinawa Shin Mimpō in 1948 reprinted an article from Hawaii Times of Jun. 5th, Uruma Shimpō of October 25th, and 
Kōsei Okinawa from Honolulu of December 5th. Kōsei Okinawa, May 1948 issue reports the list of Okinawan publications they received 
from Japan, Okinawa and Brazil, in which Okinawa Shin Mimpō and Uruma Shimpō are found.
20 Nakayoshi Ryōkō, “Okinawa will return to Japan: If local people wish / Return to Japan / Refrain from being mute like stones” (沖縄の
復帰：地元住民が希望せば／日本に返へる／石の如く黙するをさけよ) in Okinawa Shin Mimpō, Apr. 5, 1951. Kamiyama Seiryō, “Suggestion 
for reversion to Japan,” vol.3 in Uruma Shimpō, Feb. 13,1951.
21 Takamine Meitatsu, “Okinawa, where are you going,” vol. 1, Uruma Shimpō, Jul. 10, 1951.
22 Nakayoshi Ryōkō, “Strong will of islanders as key for reversion” (日本復帰は島民の決意が鍵) in Okinawa Shin Mimpō, Aug. 5, 1951.
23 The New Year interview with Taira, Okinawa Times, January 1, 1951.
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second” style of their counterparts in Tokyo? Focus 
should be set on the contemporary socio-political 
factors in order to answer the questions.
Local Okinawans under U.S. control
As I mentioned, the pro-reversionists in Okinawa 
described the post-reversion blueprint as one in 
which pre-war Okinawa would be resurrected. They 
assumed that Japan, the newborn democratic state, 
would assure political rights and support economic 
rehabilitation. This logic, i.e. that reversion to Japan 
equaled returning to the “normal” Okinawa, implied 
that the then current situation of Okinawa was 
somehow “irregular.” 
Okinawa had changed drastically, however, by the 
time of the peace treaty. The construction of the U.S. 
base and related industries received huge investment 
and caused a sudden economic “bubble.” On the 
other hand, some social aspects such as agriculture 
and education were paid less attention and provided 
less money (Toriyama 2013: 103-107, 112-121). 
Agriculture was once the main industry of Okinawa 
in the prewar era, but the majority of the arable 
land was taken forcibly by the Unites States for the 
military’s use in the first few years of the occupation 
era (Toriyama 2013: 133-134, 153-157). Taking 
these postwar changes into account, together with 
the frustration and worries of the local Okinawans 
caused by the rapid social change, the way the pro-
reversionists imagined the future of Okinawa can 
be interpreted as a form of negation of the present 
Okinawa that has been customized for U.S. military 
purposes. 
The U.S. presence in Okinawa was intensive. It held 
exclusive power in governing Okinawa, which was 
unlike mainland Japan where GHQ exercised control 
indirectly. In such an atmosphere, it is easy to imagine 
how difficult it would be to question the future of 
the U.S. bases should Okinawa return to Japan. Vice 
Governor Matayoshi Kowa implied such difficulty 
in his contribution to Uruma Shimpō. Showing his 
understanding of the desire of Okinawan leaders in 
Tokyo, he said that pro-reversion argument is “too 
sensitive an issue” in facing the U.S. friends who had 
given the hand of support to the devastated Okinawa 
and shared the hardship of reconstructing it.24 
Added to this, the political tension in East Asia 
at that time made the local Okinawans feel that they 
could not intervene in or negotiate with the United 
States over the military bases. The Korean War had 
broken out in June 1950, roughly one year prior to 
the San Francisco Peace Treaty Conference. By the 
time of the Okinawa status debate, as mentioned 
already, many articles in local newspapers suggested 
that Okinawa would be put under the trusteeship of 
the United States or the United Nations. Keeping 
silent on the military base issue in the pro-reversion 
argument might have been the safest strategy the local 
people could take in such a political climate.25 
Okinawans in Tokyo and their reversion-to-Japan 
argument might evoke the image of “colonial elites.” 
Previous work points out the cultural hegemony 
Okinawans in Tokyo held over fellow Okinawans 
(Tobe 2000: 50-51). Indeed, most of the active 
reversionists in Tokyo were “successful people,” 
such as ex-bureaucrats and an ex-Diet member. 
Nevertheless, they represented all of the Okinawan 
people. Regarded themselves as an “outsider,” they 
behaved as an informant when summoned to the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs.26 They kept sending 
24 Matayoshi Kowa, “On the status issue” (帰属問題をめぐって), Uruma Shimpō, Jun. 25, 1951.
25 To put the stress on the cultural, historical, and “blood line” connections between Okinawa and Japan (Japan as parents and Okinawa as 
an orphan, for example), so as to describe the reunion with Japan as “the natural course,” could be understood as the strategy of the pro-
reversion group in order to mitigate the impression that they were rejecting the U.S. control over Okinawa.
26 At the committee, the summoned Okinawans stated it was the wish of all islanders to have Japanese sovereignty over Okinawa even if 
they are put under “leased land” with the military bases. “Even if becoming leased land militarily / Okinawa hopes reversion to Japan / Ie 
and Nakayoshi plead in the Committee on foreign affairs,” Okinawa Shin Mimpō, Feb. 15, 1951.
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the message to the decision makers that they would 
accept, if reluctantly, the military bases in exchange 
for Japanese sovereignty over Okinawa.27 
Local anti-reversionists were dissatisfied with such 
behavior by their representatives. Shiroma Morio, 
who posted a series of articles questioning the pro-
reversion opinion, claimed that “we, Okinawan 
residents” had never received any inquiry from Tokyo 
about their opinion on the Okinawa status issue, nor 
had they entrusted Okinawans in Tokyo with authority 
regarding this matter. His statement was a reaction to 
the message the Tokyo group had sent to Ambassador 
John Foster Dulles that the local Okinawans in 
Okinawa also wished to return to Japan but that they 
had just hesitated to clarify their opinion.28 
Okinawans in Tokyo/Japan
The behavior of the Okinawan elites might have 
come mainly from their personal affinity with Japan. 
They could simply be criticized for having been 
ignorant about the local Okinawan situation. This 
study, however, tries to clarify why the majority 
of Okinawans in Japan also supported that sort of 
argument, by taking the contemporary factors into 
account, that is, the ambiguous political status of the 
Okinawans under the GHQ occupation, and of the 
Korean people oppressed in Japanese society due 
to their dual status of being “liberated people” and 
“Japanese.”
Koreans and the Okinawans had been exposed to 
similar discriminatory treatment under the prewar 
Empire of Japan, while their legal and administrative 
status varied in some aspects such as the eligibility 
and suffrage for national election and the category 
of Koseki (household registration). “No Korean, no 
Ryukyuan” in “room for rent” signs indicates their 
similar social status in prewar Japan (Ishihara 1992: 
96). Okinawan people sometimes compared their 
social position to the “colonies.” Higa Shunchō, an 
Okinawan intellectual living in Tokyo, wrote in his 
diary in September 1910 that Okinawa is the first 
son, Taiwan the second and Korea the third, when he 
referred to the annexation of Korea by Japan (Higa 
1969:37). Prewar Japanese society tended to regard 
Okinawan people as akin to Korean people, which 
was more obvious in Kansai area where the largest 
communities of both were located (Uechi 2015: 9). 
The legal status of Okinawans under GHQ 
occupation was unclear. Official statements by the 
Japanese government suggested that they were 
supposed to be Japanese until the Peace Treaty was 
enacted. General MacArthur made the statement 
in July 1947 that Okinawans are not Japanese 
(Amakawa et al. ed. 1996: 30).29 Indeed, Okinawan 
people were the subject of the census survey in 
March 1946, together with Koreans, Taiwanese and 
Chinese.30 GHQ repatriation programs implemented 
on the basis of the census intended to send back 
“non-Japanese” to their homelands. While the GHQ 
repatriation project sent 141,582 Okinawans back to 
their home islands by the end of 1946, 60,000 or more 
stayed in Japan (Amakawa et al. ed. 1996: 32). The 
decision to return or not was a difficult one due to the 
limited information on the United States controlling 
27 Some petitions sent to GHQ authorities and the Japanese government by the Association for reversion of the Okinawan islands to Japan 
contain the names of Kamiyama and Takamine as well as that of Ie Chōjo, a prewar Diet member (member of the House of Peers), and 
Nakayoshi Ryōkō, the founder. See, for example, the petition to MacAuthur dated Oct. 2,1946 (Nakayoshi Ryōkō Documents, vol.1, 001, 
Naha City Museum of History), and a document titled “Petition on Okinawa’s reversion to Japan” sent to “Democratic Party of Japan, the 
House of Councilors” which seems to be dated in 1947 (Nakayoshi Ryōkō Documents, vol.1, 002).
28 Shiroma Morio, “On status issue: Putting question on the reversion-to-Japan” (帰属問題に就いて─日本帰属の内実を問う─), Uruma 
Shimpō, vol.1, Feb. 21. 
29 “Okinawans are not Japanese / General MacArthur’s statement” (沖縄人は日本人ではない／マ元帥の見解発表) in Okinawa Shin Mimpō, 
Jul. 15, 1947.
30 “Survey on return or stay / Implement in March 18” (帰るか、残留かの調査／三月十八日一斉に実施／洩れなく登録しよう) in Okinawa Shin 
Mimpō, Mar. 5, 1951.
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Okinawa. Being cut off from Japan administratively, 
it was difficult for them to come back to Japan once 
they were repatriated to Okinawa (Tobe 2010: 230-
235). Okinawans who had decided to stay on in Japan 
had no choice but to keep on making a living in Japan.
Okinawan people who had stayed back in Japan 
started to regard themselves as “non-Japanese.”31 In 
the early occupation period, Okinawans were willing 
to utilize their unique status to try and secure their 
day-to-day existence. The League of Okinawans (沖
縄人連盟) petitioned and won a GHQ proclamation 
in January 1946 that referred to Okinawans as 
“refugees,” in respect of whom special consideration 
was required.32 The League of Okinawans described 
their social position thus, that they “have to demand 
the right to live as Japanese from the Japanese 
government” while they “have to request protection 
as non-Japanese to the GHQ authority.”33 The League 
of Okinawans also held communication with Korean 
organizations over the “common” issues they faced in 
Japanese society (Tobe 2004: 223). 
The legal status of Korean people in GHQ Japan was 
also ambiguous. They numbered approximately two 
million in Japan at the end of the World War II (Kim 
1997: 77). With the voluntary return and repatriation 
project of GHQ, 538,196 Koreans had stayed back 
as on April 30, 1950, thus constituting the biggest 
ethnic group in postwar Japan (Amakawa et al. ed. 
1996: 196). Officially, they held Japanese nationality 
until the Peace Treaty enacted between Japan and 
the Allied Powers, similarly to the Okinawans. The 
GHQ authority, however, excluded them from the 
“Japanese” category while recognizing that they had 
been Japanese subjects, and held the option to treat 
them as “hostile nationals” (like the Japanese) if 
necessary (Amakawa et al. ed. 1996: 11). 
Japanese society tended to regard Korean people 
as “disruptive elements” since the early occupation 
period (Heo 2010: 169-172). The Hanshin educational 
struggle in April 1948, the first and the only case 
in which GHQ issued an emergency declaration, 
symbolized the severe suppression of the Korean 
people in Japan.34 The nation-wide newspaper Asahi 
Shimbun frequently featured reports on Korean-
related events and incidents from 1948 to 1949: the 
Hanshin educational struggle from April to May 1948, 
North Korean flag-raising cases in late 1948, the 
control over illegal brewing from late 1948 to the first 
half of 1949, and the closing down of Korean ethnic 
schools and resistance of the Korean community 
in late 1949. Most of the descriptions connoted a 
negative evaluation of the Koreans. For example, an 
article of April 24, 1948 points out “the unlawful and 
irresponsible leaders in the Korean community” as 
partially responsible for “the recent social disorders.” 
It continues that GHQ authority has stated that all of 
the remaining Koreans in Japan should obey Japanese 
laws and regulations since November 1946.35 Similar 
unfriendly tones could be found in other articles.36 
The Korean Ambassador to Japan also pointed out 
31 Nagaoka Chitarō “Characteristic of the League of Okinawans” (沖縄人聯盟の性格に就て) in Jiyū Okinawa, May 5, 1946. Jiyū Okinawa 
is the periodical issued by the League of Okinawans.
32 “Directive from General MacArthur GHQ , “Japanese government shall provide food, housing, clothing to the indigent Okinawan 
refugees” (マ司令部の指令“窮乏せる沖縄避難民に対し政府は十分な食糧と住宅、衣料寝具等を支給すべし”／沖縄本島への帰還可能性調査
中／連盟の請願を認め暖かい処置) in Jiyū Okinawa, Jan. 25, 1946. 
33 Editorial “Under the flag of the League” (聯盟の旗の下に) in Jiyū Okinawa, Jun. 15, 1946. 
34 Hanshin Educational Struggle refers to the collisions in Kobe and Osaka between the GHQ-led Japanese government and Korean 
residents in Japan over the autonomy of Korean ethnic schools. Protesting to the local administration against their forcibly closing down 
Korean elementary schools, large demonstrations were held on April 24, 1948. More than 1700 people were arrested in Kobe. A clash in 
Osaka resulted in the death of a teenage boy shot by Japanese police (Kim 1997: 409-411). 
35 “Abide by Japanese law / On Korean school case / Authority’s statement” in Asahi Shimbun, Oct. 23, 1948.
36 For example, “Big scuffle in getting back the seized illegal liquor / Again in Yao city / 8 police injured” (Oct. 23, 1948) and “4 teachers 
‘confined’ / Complaining ‘we don’t understand Japanese’ / 200 Korean children” (Dec. 3, 1949).
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the negative image imparted in the way Japanese 
mass media reported on Korean-related cases, in the 
memorandum sent to the Chief of Staff in April 1949 
(Kim 1997: 537-538). 
To be regarded as similar to Korean people 
meant another difficulty in GHQ Japan because 
of the connection between Korean organizations 
and the communist party. GHQ first supported the 
communists as an anti-militaristic and pro-democratic 
group. As early as May 1946, however, they started to 
harden their attitude. In May 1950 General MacArthur 
officially attacked the Japanese Communist Party in 
a public statement and banned the party’s periodical 
Akahata in June 26, the day following the outbreak of 
the Korean War (Takemae 2002: 209-210). 
Close relations of Korean people with the 
communist party were visible from the beginning of 
the occupation. Kim Chon Hae (金天海) was a leading 
figure of the prewar Japanese Communist Party, 
among the other Japanese communist leaders such as 
Shiga Yoshio (志賀義雄) and Tokuda Kyuichi (徳田球
一). A mass meeting on October 10, 1945 to celebrate 
the release of political prisoners including the three 
leaders gathered more than 1,000 people, the majority 
of whom were Koreans (Takamine 2002: 168-171; Kim 
1997: 172).37 The League of Koreans, the nation-wide 
ethnic organization in Japan founded in October 1945, 
was largely dominated by the Korean communists by 
1947 (Kim 1997: 177). 
Besides the activist network from the prewar era, 
the Korean organizations’ approach to the Communist 
Party should be ascribed to the severe living conditions 
of the Koreans in GHQ Japan. Dismantling of the 
Japanese munitions companies and repatriation of 
more than 10 million Japanese from the overseas 
territories resulted in high unemployment rates 
among the Korean population. Illegal breweries and 
other small businesses were the way they made their 
living (Rhee 2013: 137-142). The League of Koreans 
tackled this hardship by engaging in campaigns and 
activities to secure their right of living (Heo 2010: 
175-179), in which the Japanese Communist Party 
cooperated. They even proclaimed, in the first-year 
commemoration meeting of the Hanshin Educational 
Struggle held in April 1949, that joining the party was 
the only way to realize better living conditions. More 
than 300 Koreans joined the Japanese Communist 
Party on the same day, and another 1,300 did by July. 
The recruitment of such a large number of people 
was meant to be, as the League of Koreans clarified, 
a mass demonstration against suppression by the 
Japanese government (Kim 1997: 543-544).
GHQ Government Section (GS) had paid special 
attention to the League of Koreans since the North 
and South Korean governments were established in 
the Korean peninsula in August and September 1948 
(Kim 532-533). The ex-enemy state Japan became 
the strategic bulwark for the United States against 
the rise of communism in East Asia. In August 1949, 
GS suggested to Japanese officials that the League 
of Koreans be dissolved. This decision reflected the 
need GHQ felt to deter the League of Koreans from 
exerting influence over the political climate in the 
Korean Peninsula as well as in Japan (Kim 1997: 561-
564, 567). 
The negative representation of the Korean people 
under the shadow of the Communist Party is the clue 
to understanding the “Japanese sovereignty first” 
discourse brought in by pro-reversionist Okinawans 
in Tokyo. Collaboration between the League of 
Okinawans and Korean organizations seems to have 
ceased in the first half of 1947 (Tobe 2004: 223). At 
the central meeting held in July 1948, a member of 
the League of Okinawans criticized another member 
who gave a speech to encourage Korean people in 
the Hanshin struggle rally as his act would “have a 
37 The release of the political prisoners was realized on the initiative of Korean communists (Kim 1997: 170; Takemae 2002: 174).
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serious impact on the public image” of the League. 
The article reporting the central meeting also picked 
up the members’ unwillingness to be regarded as 
pro-communist.38 When Kamiyama Seiryō, the ex-
bureaucrat and active pro-reversionist, was assigned 
to the chair of the League of Okinawans in August 
1948, he visited the official residence of the prime 
minister to explain “the characteristics of the League 
of Okinawans” to correct “the misunderstanding” 
of prime minister Yoshida (Kamiyama ed. 1966: 
25). The League of Okinawans changed its name 
to the League of Okinawa (沖縄連盟) in October 
1949. Kamiyama retrospectively admitted that the 
intention in changing the organization’s name was to 
differentiate themselves from the League of Koreans, 
“that means, the sort of communists” (Arasaki 1982: 
44-45). 
Okinawan people with their ambiguous nationality 
and memory of discrimination in prewar Japan 
realized the difficulties of living in Japan as a “foreign 
national.” An article in Okinawa Shin Mimpō, June 
25, 1951 stated that Okinawan people in Japan are 
Japanese who hold suffrage, and are entitled to the 
rights of subsistence and free choice of employment 
as was declared in the new Japanese constitution. 
The article describes the embarrassing situations 
they experience in their daily lives, such as being 
told not to vote in the election, requests to present a 
foreign resident registration card at their children’s 
schools, and “the unreasonable treatment in university 
admission which treats Okinawans students as though 
they were as foreign as Koreans.”39 These are because 
Okinawa was regarded as a “foreign country,” the 
article explains. For those living in Japan under such 
conditions, the sovereignty of Japan over Okinawa 
was felt to be the primary goal to be achieved in the 
peace treaty.
4. Conclusion
Detailed analysis of both pro-reversion arguments 
sheds light on the contemporary socio-political 
situation among each of the groups that moved the 
Okinawans to reunion with Japan in 1951.
The pro-reversionists in Okinawa were living under 
exclusive control of the U.S. military and would, for 
the foreseeable future, have to keep living next to 
U.S. military institutions. Therefore the U.S. base 
issue was a very risky item to touch on for them. Pro-
reversion arguments with the prewar Okinawa image 
could be read as the negation of the reality in which 
the U.S. ruling and military institutions were changing 
the whole society. Keeping silence on the presence 
of U.S. bases could be understood as the strategy of 
the governed, the people with limited power in the 
increasing Cold War tension in East Asia.
In Tokyo, on the other hand, it might be true that 
the handful of “political elite” Okinawans in Tokyo 
claimed to represent the whole Okinawan community, 
working close to the Japanese policymakers. The 
majority of Okinawans in Japan also gradually 
realized how difficult it would be to live as “foreign 
nationals” and “pro-communists” in Japanese society, 
learning from the hardship the Korean community 
faced in GHQ occupied Japan. They found the way 
to secure the right to live in Japan in assuring their 
Japanese nationality. The U.S. base in Okinawa 
was something they could tolerate in exchange for 
Japanese sovereignty over Okinawa.
In retrospect, the strategy of the pro-reversionists in 
Okinawa and Tokyo in 1951 seems too optimistic and 
38 “League of Okinawans assembly in Beppu / Tackling problems” (沖縄人連盟の別府大会賑ふ / 問題の解明に真剣), in Okinawa Shin 
Mimpō, Jul. 5, 1948. 
39 “Unreasonable treatment of Okinawans as Sangokujin” (本土在住沖縄人の三国人扱いは不当／倭島局長見解を表明) in Okinawa Shin 
Mimpō, Jun. 15, 1950. 
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opportunistic. The exclusive U.S. control that lasted 
until 1972 caused serious human rights violations 
and the reversion to Japan did not drastically change 
Okinawa’s political situation in terms of the U.S. base 
installation. The concern of “leased land” was not 
overanxiousness in this sense. In postwar Japan, the 
Korean community has been fighting for the human 
rights of the ethnic minority. Political maneuvers 
in Tokyo/Japan that distanced themselves from the 
Koreans and identified with the Japanese under the 
GHQ occupation could be criticized as being selfish 
and fainthearted. 
Nevertheless, the contemporary socio-political 
context in Okinawa, Japan, and East Asia should be 
taken into account as far as the reversion to Japan in 
1972 is concerned. The early postwar pro-reversion 
issue is worthy of being revisited in order to clarify the 
way people with limited power sought better living 
conditions under the uncertain political situation of 
the early Cold War era.40 Such research will offer a 
view of the historical and structural standpoint from 
which political power operated in the early Cold 
War situation of East Asia and of how the people 
negotiated and reacted for safeguarding their own 
right of existence.
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